



Current electoral systems, though purporting to count votes equally, in
fact create legislatures that fail to represent the whole community. This
Note presents a thought experiment inviting the reader to consider seri-
ously an alternative method of selecting representatives to legislatures that
combines features of four traditional egalitarian systems: voting, lottery,
quota, and rotation. Under "lottery voting," citizens would vote for repre-
sentatives in local districts, much as they do today. Rather than automati-
cally electing the candidate who receives a majority or plurality of votes,
however, lottery voting chooses the winner in a lottery of the ballots cast:
A single ballot is randomly drawn, and the candidate chosen on that ballot
wins the election.' If A receives sixty percent of the overall vote and B
gets forty percent, A does not automatically win; rather, A's ex ante
chances of winning are sixty percent and B's are forty percent.'
Section I of the Note examines the puzzle of minority participation in a
majoritarian political system and suggests that justice for minorities may
require a new method of selecting legislatures; Section II discusses the
American jury and other historical uses of political lotteries; Section III
sketches the implications of lottery voting and demonstrates how it could
be used to create a richer democracy; and Section IV surveys the practical
and constitutional limitations on lottery voting as a mechanism of social
choice. The ideas presented furnish a novel perspective on various
problems of democratic and constitutional theory.
1. Although lottery voting might be used in a multi-member district, this Note for simplicity
assumes use in a single-member district. But see infra note 103 (suspending assumption).
2. Bruce Ackerman and Robert Paul Wolff have briefly suggested prototypes of lottery voting. See
B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 285-89 (1980); R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF
ANARCHISM 44-48 (1970). Although both touch on lottery voting as a way to decide issues, lottery
voting is workable only as a method of selecting representatives, who will in turn make ultimate
policy decisions, see infra p. 1303. Neither Wolff nor Ackerman offers extensive discussion or analysis
of the implications of lottery voting, but Ackerman concludes by "leav[ing] question[s] hanging in the
air" and inviting others to devote more serious thought to lottery voting. B. ACKERMAN, supra, at 289.
This Note takes up that invitation.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETE AND INSULAR MINORITIES
The plight of discrete and insular minorities-paradigmatically, the
poor and the black'-who are systematically denied free access to the ba-
zaar of pluralist politics poses a vexing problem in American democratic
and constitutional theory. When democratic pluralism breaks down, legis-
latures, and thus acts of legislation, lose their presumptive legitimacy."
Scholars have typically offered two solutions to ensure justice for minori-
ties, but both are problematic.
First, many have invoked footnote four of Carolene Products in support
of judicial review to remedy the structural imperfections of the legislative
marketplace. 5 Unfortunately, judges cannot vindicate minority rights sim-
ply by protecting the right to vote. Policing against malapportionment and
franchise restrictions is insufficient because "those with most of the votes
are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of the
others, or otherwise refuse to take their interests into account. "'One per-
son, one vote under these circumstances, makes a travesty of the equality
principle.' "' And despite assertions of the procedural nature of footnote-
3. For convenience, this Note will regularly use examples involving blacks to illustrate how the
prevalent method of selecting legislators disadvantages discrete minority groups in ways that other
imaginable voting systems-cumulative voting and lottery voting, for example-would not. It should
be noted at the outset, however, that the latter two systems would benefit not simply those demo-
graphic groups traditionally viewed as discrete and insular, but also ideological minorities that, pre-
cisely because they transcend traditional notions of "class" and "group" based on demography, have
rarely been viewed as paradigmatic "victims" of majoritarianism. Libertarians and socialists, for ex-
ample, are rarely catalogued as discrete and insular minorities, yet they too have been systematically
denied fair representation in legislatures governed by current electoral rules, and would benefit from
lottery voting or cumulative voting. See infra notes 61, 64, pp. 1296-97. Indeed, part of the appeal of
these two voting systems is that they reduce the need to rely on judges to define which minorities are
"discrete and insular" enough to warrant special solicitude. See infra p. 1285.
4. Where true pluralism prevails, the principle of majority rule enjoys singular appeal as the
"fair" and "democratic" process for resolving political disputes. Because legislatures are more sensitive
than courts to majoritarian impulses, it is often argued that courts should ordinarily defer to legisla-
tures unless some structural imperfection in the political marketplace exists, such as discrimination
against discrete and insular minorities. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DM'rst usr (1980).
Part of the appeal of the majority-rule principle lies in its guarantee that, on any given issue, there
will be more winners than losers. In the absence of real pluralism, however, this justification for
majoritarianism and legislative supremacy rings hollow. If certain groups almost always find them-
selves on the losing end of important votes, then majoritarianism may mask a tyranny that consistently
rewards some citizens by oppressing others. The promise of pluralism is that the cumulative benefits
of majoritarianism-that there will be more winners than losers-should redound to all relevant
groups in society as they form cross-cutting alliances on different issues. By coalition-building and
horse-trading, each group has the chance to win on the issues most important to it by making conces-
sions on less important issues.
5. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("statutes directed at
particular religious . . . national . . . or racial minorities" or reflecting "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities" may tend "seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordina-
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry"); J. ELY, supra note 4 (offering a "process-oriented" footnote-four theory of judicial
review); L LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 12, 108-12 (1975) (integrating footnote four into author's
theory of "implied judicial power").
6. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 135 (quoting J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 8-9
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four jurisprudence, 7 Carolene Products judges who go beyond merely
"clearing the channels of political change"' invariably confront knotty
substantive questions' and must make substantive value choices. These
judges are not directly accountable to the electorate1"; nor is there any
guarantee that they will be personally more representative of discrete and
insular minorities than legislators.11 To make matters worse, judges re-
ceive information only in a passive and cramped way: Under Carolene
Products, justice is blindered
12
A second typical solution, epitomized by Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion13 and the civil rights legislation of the 1960's,"4 is to assimilate mi-
norities into the mainstream of American society so that they shed their
discreteness and insularity. But mandatory integration-whether of neigh-
(1979)).
7. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 102-03.
8. Id. at 105. Examples of such procedural "channel deanings" include Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down Virginia poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (correcting malapportionment with "one person, one vote" standard).
9. For example: Why are the poor and the black discrete and insular minorities worthy of special
judicial solicitude, but not, say, burglars? Where do homosexuals, hippies, and anarchists fit in? Ex-
actly how much are the poor entitled to? Which majority values are illegitimate prejudices and which
are valid expressions of public morality? See Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131
(1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980).
10. Federal judges, for example, are not directly elected. Although the process of nomination and
confirmation, the obligation to justify judicial decisions, and the possibility of impeachment are impor-
tant mechanisms of judicial accountability, the judiciary is undeniably less electorally accountable than
the two other branches of government.
11. When President Carter took office in 1977, "only 22 blacks or Hispanics and 6 women sat
among the more than 500 active federal jurists." Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?:
Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & PoL'y
REV. 270, 271 (1983).
12. One might argue that the time for reflection that judges enjoy contributes to a less hurried and
more informed decisionmaking than in the legislature. Any general comparative judicial advantage in
factfinding, however, at best extends only to narrow "adjudicative" facts to be gleaned from the re-
cord, not to the broader sorts of "legislative facts" that must inform the judge's attempt to apply a
footnote-four jurisprudence. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958) (parties
may often have little or nothing to contribute to development of legislative facts); D. HoRowrrz, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45-56 (1977) (pointing out barriers to accurate judicial determinations
of legislative facts). Legislators can initiate investigations into subjects of interest; judges must wait for
litigants to come to them and typically receive information only through formal submissions by advo-
cates of self-interested parties who meet technical requirements for standing. Although increased judi-
cial initiative and greater participation by amid might help to fill in the gaps created by the adver-
sarial system, see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1979), a trial is no substitute for a legislative hearing. The rules of evidence
constrain judicial factfinding, and ex parte communications-even with other judges not involved in
the case-are unusual if not unethical. The legislator, in contrast, can regularly poll constituents and
colleagues and can confer with anyone who might help flesh out the facts.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate is inherently unequal).
14. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. 1981)) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment and in federally assisted programs); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1976 & Supp. 1981)) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in housing).
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borhoods, workplaces or schools-may erode or even destroy the distinc-
tive culture of a minority group. Moreover, truly effective assimilation can
be enormously intrusive, coercive, and expensive. Thirty years after
Brown, an extraordinary number of whites still fight or flee forced racial
integration.15
Thus, both Carolene Products and Brown are at best imperfect barriers
to overweening majoritarianism. There is, however, a third approach that
transcends the limitations of Brown and Carolene Products: We can
restructure the legislature itself1 so that minority interests are more fairly
represented in the framing of legislation. This Note explores one possible
restructuring-lottery voting. The Note uses this example of pure proce-
dural justice1" as a theoretical model to illustrate the ways in which cur-
rent voting rules deny minorities full legislative representation, and to of-
fer an alternative vision of a more truly pluralistic selection of
representatives. Before turning directly to the legislature, however, the
Note considers briefly another pillar of Anglo-American democracy: the
jury. This survey of the history and theory of the jury furnishes certain
insights relevant to the process of selecting representatives.1"
15. See generally Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (discussing ob-
struction and "white flight").
16. "[I]t must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare
of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,
270 (1904) (Holmes, J.). See also Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
17. The phrase is borrowed from J. RAwis, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14, at 86 (1971): "[P]ure
procedural justice obtains when . . . there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is
likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed."
Lotteries are often presented as paradigmatic illustrations of pure procedural justice. See, e.g., B.
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 289; Greely, The Equality of Allocation By Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 113, 122 n. 43 (1977).
18. It should not be surprising that the American jury experience might have important implica-
tions for democratic theory in general and for the structuring of legislatures in particular. Indeed, one
eminent jury theorist has written: "Each jury is a little parliament. The jury sense is the parliamen-
tary sense." P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956). For similar analogies between jurors and legis-
lators as democratic representatives, see, e.g., R.H. LEE, Letters of a Federal Fanner, Letter IV
(October 12, 1787), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 316 (P. Ford
ed. 1968) ("The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of the people by their
representatives in the legislature, are those fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this
country, their true proportion of influence, and the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves
in the community."); A. DE TOCQuEvsi.E, DEMOCRACY N AMERiCA 291-97 (Vintage ed. 1945)
("The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a
consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage. They are two instruments of equal
power, which contribute to the supremacy of the majority. . . .The jury is that portion of the nation
to which the execution of the laws is entrusted, as the legislature is that part of the nation which
makes the laws. . . ."). See also Federal Jury Selection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inprove-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1967)
(comments of Judge Irving R. Kaufman) [hereinafter cited as Jury Hearings]:
If the law is to reflect the moral sense of the community, the whole community-and not just a
special part-must help to shape it. If the jury's verdict is to reflect the community's judg-
ment-the whole community's judgment-jurors must be fairly selected from a cross-section of
the whole community, not merely a segment of it."
1286
Lottery Voting
II. LOTTERIES AND DEMOCRACY
A. The American Jury
The jury has long been hailed as a cornerstone of democratic govern-
ment,1" and as American democracy has evolved, so has the American
jury.20 Until recently, jurors were often chosen by a "key man" system.
Local selectmen were given discretion to handpick jurors of exemplary
moderation and wisdom. In theory, these "blue ribbon" juries distilled the
public morality. In practice, the "key man" system spawned a systematic
underrepresentation on juries of the poor, the nonwhite, the young, the
old, and women.21
In the past thirty years, however, a different conception of the jury has
emerged. In this modern vision, which received its fullest judicial expres-
sion in Taylor v. Louisiana,22 the jury should represent "a fair cross sec-
tion of the community."23 To implement this vision, many commentators
have called for,24 and many jurisdictions have adopted,2" a "key number"
system in which a lottery is used to generate the jury venire.
Though referring only to juries, Judge Kaufman's remarks would seem to apply afortiori to legisla-
tures, the true law-shapers. Of course, important institutional differences between juries and legisla-
tures exist. See infra notes 45, 131. The jury is simply a convenient analogy.
19. In 1774, the First Continental Congress asserted that "the respective colonies are entitled to
• . . the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the
course of [common] law." DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, art. 5
(1774). Two years later, the colonists' formal list of grievances against King George specifically in-
cluded the deprivation "in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776). The ambiguity of the only provision in the original Constitu-
tion referring to juries, art. III, § 2, cl. 3, was the source of considerable discussion and some appre-
hension during the ratification period. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCER-
TAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 7 (1977). The passage of the Bill of Rights cured
the ambiguity by elaborating on the right to a jury in no less than three of the first ten amendments.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII. Yet another amendment that would have obliged state govern-
ments to furnish juries was adopted by the House, but deleted by the Senate. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 78
(J. Gales ed. 1789).
For more recent expressions of the jury's importance as a palladium of American democracy, see
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (celebrating "democratic ideals of trial by
jury"); J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 1 ("The jury is the most democratic of our institutions."); Imlay,
Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247 (1973).
20. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942) ("Our notions of what a proper jury is
have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government.").
21. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 23-44; Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Juy-Selection
Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1, 88 (1975).
22. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments Louisiana's
exclusion of women jurors).
23. Id. at 527.
24. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of theJudicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 16-19.
25. In 1968, Congress enshrined "the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross section of the community" for federal court cases in the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) (emphasis added). See also UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND SERvicE ACT § 1,
13 U.L.A. 512 (1970) (providing for jury selection "at random from a fair cross section of the popula-
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The older vision, however, has not vanished altogether. Peremptory
challenges at voir dire, in both civil and criminal cases, are still permitted
in every state and in federal courts.2" Peremptory challenges stretch back
to the colonial period, and have long enjoyed the blessing of the Supreme
Court.27 Indeed, in the pre-Taylor case of Swain v. Alabama, 8 the Court
held that a prosecutor may use race-conscious peremptory challenges to
reduce or eliminate minority group representation on a given jury. The
tension between Swain and Taylor 9 has energized a debate among con-
temporary commentators. Those who cling to Swain's conception of the
jury have argued for extensive peremptory challenges to filter out jurors
who might render the jury less moderate."0 In contrast, those who em-
brace Taylor favor severe restrictions on-if not outright abolition
of-peremptory challenges, since such challenges enable lawyers to
wrench an unrepresentative jury from a cross-sectional venire.31
Several insights flow from these developments in the law and theory of
the jury. First, a tension clearly exists in democratic theory 2 between the
conception of democratic representatives as citizens of moderation and
stature-men of the middle who each represent the soundest instincts and
values of the communityss-and the conception of representatives as a
cross-sectional group that collectively will be representative of all impor-
tant subgroups" ' within the community. 5 Second, the lottery can plainly
tion of the area served by the court.") As of 1977, 33 states and the District of Columbia used key
number systems based on random selection to generate "master wheels" for trial jury venires. J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 19, app. A.
26. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, app. D.
27. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887) (upholding peremptory challenge system). On the
history of peremptory challenges, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 145-51; Note, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1716-24
(1977).
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. The Court recently denied certiorari in three cases involving the use of peremptory challenges
to remove all blacks from juries. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983). Justices Marshall
and Brennan, noting the apparent conflict between Swain and Taylor, dissented from the denial while
Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Powell acknowledged the importance of the issue but preferred to
allow further consideration of the question by state courts. Id.
30. See, e.g., Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545
(1975) (arguing for defendant's right to peremptory challenge); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the
Meaning ofJury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980) (arguing for narrow reading of Taylor's
cross-sectional requirement and for retaining prosecutorial challenges).
31. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 166-69; Imlay, supra note 19, at 269-71; Note, supra
note 27, at 1733-41.
32. It is unsurprising that this tension surfaces in debates about how the jury, our "most demo-
cratic" institution, should be structured.
33. This is, of course, precisely the philosophy underlying the peremptory challenge system. See
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (peremptory challenges "eliminate extremes"); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19,
at 168 (peremptory challenges render "jury more homogeneous than the population at large").
34. This is the vision informing Taylor.
35. A similar tension exists in legislative theory: "[E]lected representatives can operate in two
fundamentally different and contradictory ways: they can either reflect the sentiments and feelings of
the people, or refine and improve upon their views. They can provide for likeness or competence."
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be a powerful tool to implement the cross-sectional ideal.36 Finally, the
modern trend seems to be towards random selection and cross-
sectionalism.
7
B. Lotteries, Cross-Sectionalism, and Voting
Except to choose jurors, Americans have rarely used the lottery as a
serious part of their selection of representatives.3 8 Yet the use of the lot-
Rossum, Representation and Republican Government: Contemporary Court Variations on the Foun-
ders' Theme, 23 AM. J. JuRis. 88, 104 (1978).
36. On the use of lotteries to affirm egalitarian values and recognize human dignity by promoting
equality of opportunity and fair treatment, see Greely, supra note 17. Greely demonstrates that lotter-
ies can promote the ideals of both equal protection and due process, argues that random selection
enables "a democracy to reaffirm its commitment to human equality," id. at 141, and concludes that
lottery systems "should be considered more often," id. Interestingly, it has been held in lifeboat situa-
tions, where some passengers must be starved or jettisoned to save the rest, that-where conditions
permit-the selection must be made by lot. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1842) ("In no other than this or some like way are those having equal rights put upon an equal
footing. . . ."). Thus, majorities do not rule in the lifeboat polity. Cf. Jonah 1:7 (King James) ("So
they cast lots, and the lot fell upon Jonah."). The lottery also figures prominently in recent literature
in political philosophy on just and sensible social choice rules. See, e.g., Fishburn, Lotteries and Social
Choice, 5 J. EcoN. THEORY 189 (1972) (discussing uses of lottery in response to problems created by
Condorcet voting paradox ("Arrow's theorem")); Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a
Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594 (1975) (basing
social choice rule on decisions individuals would make behind veil of ignorance if each had equal
chance of inheriting any slot in distributive pattern of entitlements chosen behind veil).
37. The first two insights are paralleled by observations of Bruce Ackerman, who notes a tension
in democratic theory between strict majority rule-i.e., rule by the median voter, the man in the
middle-and allocation by lot: "[T]hinkers faced with the problem of pure procedural justice have
often looked to the lottery as a mechanism that might fairly resolve some kinds of dispute. On the level
of political practice, however, we have tended to resolve good-faith disagreements by an appeal to
majority rule." B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 289.
The third insight is strengthened by modern uses of lotteries in other areas to secure a more equal
distribution of governmental benefits and burdens. The Vietnam War draft lottery, especially after the
abolition of the college exemption, dramatically attests to the lottery's egalitarian power to distribute
burdens cross-sectionally. See Greely, supra note 17, at 115 n.17. More recently, Congress has explic-
itly given the Federal Communications Commission discretion to use the lottery as part of its system
for allocating broadcast licenses, 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (West Supp. 1981); and the Department of the
Interior has, where competitive bidding is not required, employed lotteries to determine which of
several applicants will be permitted to lease government lands with oil and gas producing potential. 43
C.F.R. § 3112.4-1 (a) (1982). For a thorough and prophetic discussion of the actual and potential uses
of lotteries as allocative engines in a democratic society, see Greely, supra note 17; see also G. CALA-
BRESI & P. BoBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 41-44, 49 (1978) (discussing lotteries as allocative
instruments).
38. The lottery and voting have occasionally intersected in American democracy. Under the
"Hare" system of proportional representation, votes are initially tallied according to the voters' first
choices, and then transferred in accordance with the voters' individual preference schedules from those
candidates who cannot win or do not need the votes to win to those candidates who can and do. See
J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 108-26 (C. Shields ed. 1958)
(describing and praising "Hare" system); Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful
At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 150-52 (1982) (discussing "Hare" system). Several cities have
elected local legislative bodies by using random selection of "surplus" ballots in elections based on the
"Hare" system. See Cambell v. Board of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (rejecting challenge
to use of geographic lottery as part of "Hare" system election of New York City's schoolboard);
Moore v. Election Comm'rs, 309 Mass. 303, 305 N.E.2d 222 (1941) (upholding "Hare" system with
lottery selection of "surplus" votes in Cambridge, Mass.); Silva, Relation of Representation and the
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tery to select leaders has venerable historic roots. In ancient Athens, sorti-
tion was a prominent feature of the representative-selection process under
the Cleisthenic Constitution;"9 the Venetian republic also relied heavily on
the lot.40 America's rejection of these ancient models for selecting assem-
blies is readily understandable. An assembly selected by lot is a collec-
tively representative sample of the underlying pool"1 (presumably, the
polity as a whole),42 but in an important sense, its individual members are
not complete representatives because they are not accountable to constitu-
ent groups in the polity in the way that modern legislators are.43 If candi-
dates are elected by citizen votes, those who do not correctly represent the
interests of their constituents will lose. If, however, seats in the assembly
are distributed purely by lot, the reward of legislative tenure is wholly
disengaged from past or promised job performance. No matter how popu-
lar a "candidate" is, he stands the same chance of "election."'" No matter
how well an incumbent does his job, he stands the same chance of "re-
election."
'4 5
The cross-sectional ideal behind the lottery, however, remains a power-
ful and informing vision in electoral theory. The promise of Reynolds v.
Sims' "one person, one vote" principle, for example, is that all votes will
count equally. 46 Yet the reality of Reynolds is that when representatives
are selected by majority rule, the votes of those in the minority do not truly
count.17 Because of gerrymanders, 4  geographic dispersion of minority
Party System to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 W. POL. SCI. Q. 742,
758 (1964) (citing examples of Kalamazoo, Ashtabula, Cleveland, and Sacramento). For a more de-
tailed treatment of Cambell and Moore, see infra note 126.
The lot is also sometimes used to determine placement of candidate names on the ballot. See McCoy
v. Mayer, 333 F.2d 151, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Lotteries are regularly used to break tie votes. See
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). Additionally, the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §
1863 (1976), and many state statutes use voter registration rolls as a first approximation of the pool
from which jury venires are to be randomly selected. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, app. A.
39. See A. JONES, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 100-07 (1969).
40. See R. FINLAY, POLITICS IN RENAISSANCE VENICE 141-42 (1980).
41. Of course, the larger the assembly, the more likely it is to be an accurate cross-section of the
community. See T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS 73-107 (1977). Cf. infra note 60 (presenting statistical likelihood of success under
lottery voting for hypothetical minority party).
42. See infra note 70 (discussing pool definition).
43. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 73-75 (1967).
44. This defect of a pure lottery is not shared by lottery voting. See infra p. 1299.
This Note uses the words "he" and "his" generically to apply to both genders. The choice of the
masculine pronouns was determined by lot.
45. This feature seems less problematic in jury selection: Unaccountability has historically been a
hallmark of the American jury. Never asked to give reasons for its verdict, the jury is the paradigmatic
"black box." See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 37, at 57-62. For a further discussion of
relevant differences between juries and legislatures, see infra note 131.
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (individual votes must count equally).
47. In effect, these minority votes are "counted"-i.e., tallied-and then ignored. As Ralph Ros-
sum states:
In the winner-take-all system of electing legislators employed in the United States, there is
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groups,4 and the single-ballot voting rules in effect in most jurisdictions,"
discrete and insular groups are systematically underrepresented in current
legislatures.51 In a real way, the current system has wasted their votes
instead of counting them equally, and the "one person, one vote" promise
of Reynolds has been breached.
simply no such thing as "equal representation." By its very nature, it discriminates by re-
jecting the will of the minority voters. Legislators tend to represent the interests of the majority
coalition that elects them, not the total population of their district. "Equal representation for
equal numbers of people" can be achieved only through the adoption of some system of pro-
portionate representation.
Rossum, supra note 35, at 91. For an acknowledgment of the implications of the current winner-take-
all approach to legislative elections, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (under current
system, dominant party in district can win "year after year"). See also Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips
and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 YALE L.J. 1300, 1304 (1966) (discussing
"wasted votes").
In one sense, it could be argued that all votes are fully counted because every vote is essential in
determining which single vote is the median that decides the outcome. This argument, however, masks
the real power of the general legislature to decide by its district map that a certain group of voters will
be the all-important median bloc in a given district. The power to draw district lines is the power to
decide which groups shall wield real power in a district and which groups shall be relegated to
perpetual minority status. See infra pp. 1293-96. Moreover, the argument rests on a simplistic con-
ception of society as one collective and homogeneous body politic whose center of gravity is to be
located, instead of as an agglomeration of parties and subgroups with distinct interests requiring dis-
tinct representation. See infra pp. 1296-97.
48. Courts can prevent only the most blatant gerrymanders. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (striking down "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided" district designed to ex-
clude black voters) with Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973) ("[C]ompactness or
attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for
. . . legislative districts.") and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (upholding boundary line
between congressional districts where one district was 94.9% white and other was 86.3% black and
Puerto Rican, and where there were some irregularities in boundaries and variations in total
population).
49. This dispersion makes it impossible to create a "safe" district in which a minority group
commands a local majority. See Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 402 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Miss. 1975),
aff'd, 528 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
968 (1977) (racially "neutral" plan reapportioning single-member districts gave blacks, who com-
prised 39% of the overall population, minority of voting-age population in all five districts).
50. See Silva, supra note 38, at 743-44 (single-ballot plurality vote would rarely produce legisla-
ture accurately reflecting various parties' statewide strength, even if districts drawn impartially); see
also infra p. 1292 (describing currently dominant voting rules).
51. Blacks, for example, account for about 11.9% of the population, Portrait of America, NEws-
WEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, at 33, but only about 1% of all elected officials, Seeking Votes and Clout, TIME,
Aug. 22, 1983, at 21. There has never been an elected black governor in this nation's history, nor, of
course, a black President. Although this Note does not intend to suggest that only a black can truly
represent fellow blacks, the stunning discrepancy between the percentage of black citizens and black
leaders should give us great pause. This Note contends that the systematic underrepresentation of
blacks is no mere happenstance, but a thoroughly predictable consequence of the prevalent modes of
electing public officials. A 10% minority may well be outvoted 100% of the time; it may never get to
elect its preferred candidate, and its interests may never be fairly-that is, proportion-
ately-represented in lawmaking bodies. Cf J. ELY; supra note 4, at 82: "Naturally, that cannot
mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population can never be treated less favorably than
the rest, but it does preclude a refusal to represent them . . . ." (emphasis in original).
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III. LOTTERY VOTING
Cumulative voting52 has been suggested as a way to preserve the ac-
countability guaranteed by the ballot box while fulfilling the promise of
Reynolds through the election of a cross-sectional legislature.5 In an ideal
cumulative voting system, the legislature is collectively representative of
the polity, while each member is accountable to his constituent group and
is responsible for representing that group's interests. There is, however,
another voting method that also preserves accountability while promoting
cross-sectionalism: lottery voting. Featuring both lottery and ballot box,
this system seeks to combine the best elements of the Athenian and Ameri-
can models of representation. Though it has never been used before, lot-
tery voting has powerful appeal as a theoretical model, and enjoys several
practical advantages over majority, plurality, and cumulative voting.
A. Lottery Voting Compared to the Current System
At present, the dominant methods for choosing legislators are based on
the single-ballot rule, 4 with the winner determined by either a plurality
or majority of votes cast.55 For congressional elections, single-member dis-
tricting is required,5" whereas state legislatures use both single-member
and multi-member districts.57 The kinds of legislatures spawned by most
current voting systems are sufficiently similar to be considered together58
and contrasted with the kind of legislature likely to emerge under lottery
voting.59
52. Cumulative voting requires multi-member districts; each voter is permitted to cast a number
of votes equal to the number of seats apportioned to his district, and to divide those votes among
candidates as he sees fit. He can "bullet" by casting all his votes for a single candidate, or can divide
his votes among several candidates. "Bulleting" enables a rather small minority to guarantee itself
representation in any district that has a large number of seats: In a district with n seats, a party
having the support of only 1/(n+l)th of the voters could assure itself of a seat by running one
candidate for whom all party supporters "bullet" their votes.
53. See Note, supra note 38, at 153-60 (praising cumulative voting).
54. Unlike voting schemes such as the "Hare" system, see supra note 38, a single-ballot rule does
not allow voters to rank candidates in order of preference.
55. In 1964, 98 out of 99 state legislative chambers were elected under a single-ballot plurality
rule. See Silva, supra note 38, at 742. Since then, some states have switched to a single-ballot majority
rule. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-501 (1982). For elections to the U.S. Congress, some states have
adopted a single-ballot plurality rule while others use a single-ballot majority rule. In the absence of a
uniform rule propounded by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 4, states may adopt either rule. Phillips
v. Rockefeller, 435 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1971); Bond v. Fortson, 334 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Ga.) (dic-
tum), aff'd mere., 404 U.S. 930 (1971).
56. 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1982).
57. In 1970, 46% of the upper houses and 62% of the lower houses contained some multi-member
districts. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 n.37 (1971). For a history of the various voting rules
that have been applied at the state and federal level, see id. at 156-60.
58. Cumulative voting, however, is sufficiently different to warrant special treatment. See infra
pp. 1300-03.
59. This is not to deny that important differences exist among prevalent voting systems. For ex-
ample, multi-member districting combined with a prohibition against "bulleting," see supra note 52,
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1. Proportional Representation and Cross-Sectionalism
The law of averages ensures that, at any given time, an assembly se-
lected by lottery voting would substantially reflect the underlying distribu-
tion of votes in the polity. For example, in a legislature with one hundred
seats, a slate of minority candidates with the support of five percent of the
citizens would-with at least ninety percent certainty-win between two
and eight seats.6 ° Unlike the current system, lottery voting would thus
automatically effect a proportionately representative legislature. The re-
sult would be a fluid and natural "quota" system of representation with
each group of voters61 receiving its proportionate slice of total legislative
representation. 2 This general characteristic would affect the structure of
politics in several ways.
The real tragedy of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny has been the
results in "at-large" voting that dramatically exacerbates the already-strong majoritarian bias of sin-
gle-district voting. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 134 n.1 1 (party receiving over 48% of popu-
lar vote loses every seat to majority party after at-large voting). See also Note, supra note 38 (describ-
ing and criticizing at-large voting).
60. If the party controls 5% of the vote within each district, the probability that it will receive less
than two seats is less than 4%, and the probability that it will capture more than 8 seats is about 6%.
See T. WONNAcor-r & R. WONNAcO'rr, supra note 41, at 84, 168-70 (offering formulae for com-
puting probability). Two additional points deserve mention. First, even though the party could be so
unlucky as to lose every seat in a given legislature-the likelihood of this is less than 0.6%-the odds
that it would be unrepresented in two consecutive legislatures are virtually infinitesimal:
(.006) x (.006) = 0.000036. Second, if party members are less geographically dispersed, the odds
that the party would win between 2 and 8 seats are much higher. If, for example, the party accounts
for all the voters in 5 of the equally populous districts and has no supporters in any other district, it
would always win those 5 seats, exactly 5% of the total.
61. The relevant group membership of a voter is defined not by his inherited or socio-economic
endowments, see supra note 3, or by his geographic residence, see infra note 62, but by his very vote
itself. By casting his ballot for the candidate of a given party, the voter chooses to identify his interests
with those of other party voters. This is the group most relevant to each voter's political identity, and
thus this is the group that deserves proportional representation.
62. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 736, 754 (1973) (upholding against equal protection
challenge policy of "political fairness" which aimed at a rough scheme of proportional representation
of two major political parties). Lottery voting and cumulative voting simply extend the principle of
"political fairness" to all parties. See infra pp. 1296-97.
Currently, the only quota system is geographical, with each equal-sized district being guaranteed,
by the very fact of district elections, its fair share-its quota-of total representation in the legislature.
For a classic illustration of a quota system designed to protect geographic minorities, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States. . . according to their
respective Numbers"); THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 220 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (pro-
portional taxation "effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression"). Earlier in The Federalist,
quota representation of all groups is described as impracticable: "The idea of an actual representation
of all classes of the people by persons of each class is altogether visionary . . . . IT]his will never
happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free." THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at
214-15 (A. Hamilton). Both cumulative voting and lottery voting seek to bring a measure of reality to
that "visionary" ideal, although neither system requires the people of "each class" to vote for persons
of that class as representatives. Class members are always free to vote for candidates who, although
not members of the class, may be seen as better representatives of the class interests. See supra note
51; cf. Fiss, supra note 12, at 18-22 (best class representative in structural reform lawsuit need not be
member of victim class).
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inability of courts effectively to prevent subtle gerrymanders," whether
racial, ideological, religious, or economic: 4 There is no truly neutral
benchmark against which to measure a state's districting plan, 5 and even
the most obvious racial gerrymanders can entangle judges in thorny politi-
cal thickets. 6 Ironically, Reynolds' command itself furnishes an excellent
pretext to gerrymander, since periodic redistricting is constitutionally
required.
87
The problem is that new district lines are not drawn behind a Rawlsian
"veil of ignorance. '"68 A majority party knows that drawing the lines one
way yields X safe districts, but another way, only X minus A. Under
lottery voting, however, no matter how the lines were drawn, a party
could not alter the expected number of districts that it would win so long
as districts contain equal numbers of voters.6 9 Because each citizen within
a district would have an equal chance that his vote would determine the
outcome of the election, votes of local minorities could not be effectively
63. "The question of the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds. . .".. Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
64. See Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 847, 857-61 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(political groups have same constitutional right as racial groups to be free from invidious gerryman-
ders by which "the 'ins' maximize[ ] their ability to exclude the 'outs"'), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893
(1972). For a further elaboration of Justice Stevens' views about nonracial gerrymandering, see
Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2661, 2667-78 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86-89 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Thus, although the first half of Reynolds, the equal size requirement, is judicially managea-
ble, see infra p. 1296, the second half-the drawing of district lines, see supra note 63-is far less so,
as Justice Harlan argued so presciently in his Reynolds dissent: "No set of standards can guide a
court which has to decide how many legislative districts a State shall have, or what the shape of the
districts shall be, or where to draw a particular district line." 377 U.S. 533, 621 (1964).
66. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding districting plan designed to
maintain black representation that dissipated Jewish voting strength by carving up Hasidic Jewish
neighborhood).
67. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583.
68. A veil of ignorance denies individuals access to morally arbitrary and irrelevant information.
See J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at § 24, at 136-42.
69. It could, however, reduce the variance around that mean, but this does not seem especially
problematic. The more each district is microcosmic of the overall jurisdiction, the wider the spread
around the mean number of seats a given party can expect to win. For an illustration, see supra note
60.
70. Lottery voting thus offers true "equality of opportunity." See Greely, supra note 17, at 122
("Random selection is the only allocative method which honestly can claim the objective equality of
opportunity. ... ). Moreover, one of the most problematic stages of most lotteries-defining the
overall pool (the equality of whose members the lottery affirms)-is extraordinarily straightforward in
lottery voting: All those who vote are automatically members of the pool. Cf id. at 118-20 (definition
of pool allows discretion that may frustrate lottery's goal of affirming equality, but at least choices
made in defining pool are highly visible).
Lottery voting's equality of opportunity resonates with recent language inserted into the Voting
Rights Act protecting the right of racial minorities to equal "opportunity . . .to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b) (West Supp.
1983) (emphasis added). The Act, however, establishes no right "to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Id. Neither does lottery voting. See
supra notes 51, 62.
For an argument that the true meaning of Reynolds v. Sims is that each voter should have an equal
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erased or diluted by clever districting."1 By forcing majorities 2 to draw
district maps behind a "veil of ignorance," lottery voting would thus pre-
vent gerrymanders," protect minorities, and transform redistricting into a
system of "perfect procedural justice."' 4
Lottery voting would also protect the geographically dispersed minority.
Currently, if, for example, a forty percent black minority is not clustered
together (in which case an attempt to split up its voting strength might be
too obvious to escape judicial remedy) the sixty percent white majority
could in all good faith district the state so that no district had a black
majority or near-majority."' The perverseness of the current system is ex-
traordinary: Blacks can guarantee themselves a fair share of representa-
tion only by segregating themselves." With lottery voting, in contrast,
chance to cast a decisive vote, see Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the
"One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966). Banzhaf's analysis harmonizes with
recent work in game theory, see id. at 1317, and demonstrates that equal-size districting creates a sort
of a priori equality of decisional power among voters. In actuality, however, the true weight of a
citizen's vote under current voting rules depends on the votes of those around him and thus can never
be truly equalized across all voters. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 168-69 (1971) (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 244 (1957). Under
lottery voting, by contrast, the likely or actual voting behavior of others in no way affects the likeli-
hood that a given citizen's vote would decide the election. Equality of voters within districts is guaran-
teed by the lottery, while equality of voters across districts within the jurisdiction follows automati-
cally from equal-size districting. See infra pp. 1295-96.
71. See Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding
district map giving blacks a clear majority in only 1 out of 5 districts, where blacks accounted for 48%
of total population).
72. In fact, under the current system, a dominant plurality group can, in theory, control the
legislature even if individual district elections require a majority vote. A party with 26% of the citizens
could, if its members were correctly distributed geographically, win a bare majority of seats in the
legislature, winning each seat by a bare majority. The problem of a legislature selected by majority
vote that in turn relies on majority rule is akin to the danger of rounding off an already-rounded
number. Cf J. BONBRIGHT & G. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY 18-20, 108-13 (1932) (discuss-
ing Samuel Insull's infamous holding company pyramid of the 1920's). Thus, the "one person, one
vote" rule of Reynolds, without more, can guarantee neither proportional representation nor ultimate
majoritarianism. Lottery voting, on the other hand, effects proportional representation within the leg-
islature without ultimately sacrificing majoritarianism, since the legislature selected by lottery voting
would itself use majority rule. See infra pp. 1303-04.
73. Interestingly, in The Federalist, Hamilton argues that a natural geographic lottery would
prevent a "gerrymandering" of the place of local elections:
Are the wealthy and the well-born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the
several States? . . .Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as
avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the
latter is the case (as every intelligent man knows it to be) is it not evident that the policy of
confining the places of elections to particular districts would be subversive of its own aim...?
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 370-71 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphases added; footnote omitted).
74. The phrase is John Rawls' and applies whenever "there is an independent criterion for what
is a fair division" (here, equality of voting strength across all voters) and "a procedure that is sure to
give the desired outcome" (here, lottery voting). Rawls, supra note 17, at 85. Indeed, the example
Rawls offers of a system of perfect procedural justice can be seen as an evocative metaphor for district-
ing under lottery voting: A cake must be divided into a number of "equal" portions, so one person
cuts, while others choose. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 363-68 (1957).
75. See supra note 49.
76. And of course, even if blacks are geographically segregated, their neighborhoods may not be
populous enough to comprise a majority in any district.
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four out of every ten legislators (on average) would be chosen by (ran-
domly selected) ballots cast by black citizens, no matter how dispersed
blacks were, so long as each district were of equal size. This last require-
ment is a neutral one that courts can easily police. Lottery voting would
thus prevent the district map from converting Reynolds' noble ideal of
(tone person, one vote" into a farce.
2. Party Structure
Like cumulative voting, lottery voting would tend to erode the two-
party system by allowing minor parties to spring up and flourish. The
two-party system exists today only because of the voting rules now in
force. Individuals are often forced to vote for the lesser of two major-party
evils because a third-party candidate, although perhaps attractive to many,
cannot hope to muster the requisite majority to win.7 1 Under lottery vot-
ing, by contrast, every voter could rationally cast his vote for the candidate
who is truly his first choice.7 1 Moreover, the current system creates enor-
mous electoral economies of scale and financial barriers to entry. Cur-
rently, unless a party can put together a majority or dominant plurality
coalition-no inexpensive feat-its efforts are worthless insofar as its goal
is simply to elect a representative.80 Lottery voting is not similarly skewed
77. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 124-25.
78. A. DOWNS, supra note 70, at 124; M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 217 (1967); D. RAE,
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 95-96 (1967); V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES,
AND PRESSURE GROUPS 224-31 (1952). These works establish that, under current voting rules, long-
term equilibrium rarely permits more than two parties in a given district. The fact that every district
has the same two parties is a result of certain electoral economies of scale and the "ticket" system
created by statewide and national elections.
79. Currently, a rational voter cannot always vote for his favorite candidate, because doing so may
increase the likelihood that a less favorite candidate will win. See A. DOWNS, supra note 70, at 47.
This perversity cannot occur under lottery voting. The current system thus gives rise to Condorcet and
other voting paradoxes that create incentives for strategically insincere voting. Lottery voting cures the
potential irrationalities and perversities of current collective choice rules, see generally A. SEN, CoL-
LECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970), by introducing a suprarational and neutral instru-
ment (the lot) that disaggregates collective behavior and emphasizes individual moral responsibility,
see infra pp. 1299-1300. As a result, rational voting can become a true "preference revealing" act. See
A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-25 (1980) (discussing
preference-revealing incentive schemes).
80. Although a party may have ancillary goals, the election of representatives is the raison d'etre
of the electoral system. Moreover, many subsidiary aims of a minority party would probably be better
served by lottery voting. If the party seeks to educate the electorate about its views, it is far more
likely to attract publicity if its candidate has some possibility of winning. Similarly, if the goal is to
influence the platform of a major party, lottery voting allows a minority party to threaten to withhold
its support from an undesirable major-party platform without increasing the likelihood that an even
less attractive party will win. See supra note 79. Minority parties are thus in a better position to
secure compromises from the major parties. Finally, even if a minority group could succeed in secur-
ing concessions on a major party platform, group members would likely be far better off if they could
instead elect their own first-choice candidate, who could be a better representative in legislative hear-
ings, negotiations, and debates than a major party candidate who-however faithful to the plat-
form-has no personal commitment to the minority plank forced upon him. See generally Note, Af-
firmative Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811, 1812-14 (1981) (describing other benefits
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towards the well-heeled, since it does not ignore votes for small parties
with low budgets.
Lottery voting contemplates a legislature in which individual members
are leaders of, spokesmen for, and accountable to, the many diverse groups
(parties) that make up the polity."1 This more diverse legislature would
vindicate the ideal of Madison's Federalist No. 51, which argues that
"justice and the general good" will flow from the "great variety of inter-
ests, parties, and sects" embraced by the legislature.8 2
3. Rotation of Officeholding Within Districts
In any given district, lottery voting would result in more rotation of
officeholding. Even an incumbent with the consistent support of most of
his constituents could not guarantee himself perpetual re-election. The
upshot of lottery voting would be a turn-taking system of representation
within districts.83 Over time, every group in a community would get its
of increased minority representation).
81. It is sometimes argued that a multi-party system inevitably breeds instability and confusion.
A. DowNs, supra note 70, at 142-63. Such an argument, however, is based on a parliamentary
model, and cannot be blindly extrapolated to American legislatures. In a parliamentary system, a bloc
of parties with a legislative majority forms the "government" coalition while other parties form the
"opposition." The executive officers who run the government must at all times command the backing
of a legislative majority, since the defection of a swing party on any important issue can topple "the
government" and trigger new elections. Such obstacles to shifting legislative alliances and full plural-
ism do not exist in the American system, where legislature and executive are separate.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 325 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Although this passage speaks to
diversity within the polity, The Federalist goes on to note that such diversity would:
occasion a material diversity of disposition in [the] representatives . . . . In proportion as
either [interest] prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for the very
reason that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests and in much more
various proportions than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse
either of them with a decided partiality ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 367-69 (A. Hamilton) (emphases added); see THE FEDERAUST No. 59,
at 360 (A. Hamilton) (legislature should be composed to secure "a sufficient number for the purposes
of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society") (emphasis added);
see also J. ELY, supra note 4, at 122 ("Many among the framers stressed the importance to the
system they were forging of the equal representation of equal population groups."); 1 M. FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 132 (1937) (remarks of James Wilson at
the Constitutional Convention) ("The legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole
society.").
The early Federalists, however, also favored larger districts and at-large elections in order to pro-
mote election of "the worthy." See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 471-518 (1969). Thus, Federalist writings often exhibit a serious tension: They
wanted a legislature that would reflect, and yet at the same time refine, community sentiment. To the
extent that modern legislators do not today have the sort of independence from their constituents that
Madison envisioned, today's assemblymen no longer refine the passions of the majority coalitions that
elected them as Madison hoped they would. Thus, it is all the more important to harken to the other
half of the Madisonian prescription calling for legislative diversity and pluralism. Nor need truer
reflection mean less refinement. One of the virtues of lottery voting is that legislators will continue to
be individuals of stature-acknowledged leaders of the various groups that comprise the polity. See
infra note 131.
83. The ancient Athenian system also featured turn-taking, with each of ten tribes running the
city government for 35 days a year. A. JONES, supra note 39, at 106. In the 1770's rotation of
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fair stint of representation. Lottery voting would thus gradually integrate
growing outgroups" into government and would avoid the problems of
political "tipping" that now occur when a former minority reaches fifty-
one percent of the total district population."5 Moreover, because a solid
majority in a given locality could not guarantee itself a perpetual monop-
oly on the district seat in the state legislature,"' it would have an incentive
to treat the minority more kindly. The uncertainty of outcome that a lot-
tery introduces is a check against injustice and self-interest, promoting
more even-handed laws.
8 7
Lottery voting would create a legislature of rotating citizen-legislators
instead of an entrenched group of lifetime lawmakers.88 While legislators
elected by lottery voting might have (on average) less "expertise," they
would be in closer touch with the needs and concerns of fellow citizens in
the real world of the polity.8 9 Furthermore, the fact that incumbents could
officeholding was a "cardinal tenet" of American republicanism, G. WOOD, supra note 82, at 140-41;
for example, the Pennsylvania government formed in the summer of 1776 was "permeated" with the
principle of mandatory rotation, id. at 87. The disregard of this principle in the federal constitution
sparked widespread protest. Id. at 521-22. Indeed, the absence of mandatory rotation and of a bill of
rights were Thomas Jefferson's two major criticisms of the Constitution. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
43-48 (P. Ford ed. 1895).
84. Many racial minority groups are growing as a percentage of the total population. See Portrait
of America, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, at 22.
85. Currently, when a long-excluded outgroup finally comes into power, it may come in with a
vengeance-with little experience running government and little taste for compromise.
86. Under lottery voting, access to the "natural monopoly" of a legislative district scat would be
controlled by a "common carrier" approach instead of by "regulation" by the median voter in that
district. Although Ely claims that his theory of judicial review resembles an "antitrust" as opposed to
a "regulatory" approach to structural imperfections in the political marketplace, see J. ELY, supra
note 4, at 102-03, his prescriptions are far more regulatory than he would like to admit. See supra
note 9. In essence, Ely would have courts impose a substantive "fairness doctrine" on the political
marketplace. The approach argued for in this Note is, by contrast, more analogous to an "equal time"
or "equal opportunity of access" provision, see supra note 70, and is thus more akin to the obligation
imposed on a common carrier to furnish equal access to all potential patrons.
87. In a similar vein, James Wilson proposed at the Constitutional Convention that the President
be elected by a group of electors to be chosen "by lot from the national legislature." 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 82, at 103. The uncertainty of the lot, it was argued, would thwart petty intrigue and
factionalism. Id. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[N]o
man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a
gainer today."). For other discussions of the ways in which a "veil of ignorance" leads to justice, see
J. RAWLS, supra note 17, at §§ 23-24, at 130-42; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 460a- 464e (suggesting
that mating lottery, by cloaking actual kinship ties, would encourage each citizen to treat all members
of his generation as his siblings, all elders as his parents, and all youths as his children).
88. A central tenet of early American republicanism was the belief that "representatives should
meet frequently and for a short time to correct the laws, returning immediately to private life to
experience the consequence of their actions along with other members of the society." G. WOOD,
supra note 82, at 25. The principles of short service, rotation, and citizen participation remain impor-
tant components of modern jury theory. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 111-34, app. M.
89. The value of legislative "expertise" has probably been overestimated. The proper function of
the legislature is not to draft narrow, technical codes, but to make basic policy choices by setting
priorities among competing values and establishing the general contours of acceptable tradeoffs. See
J.S. MILL, supra note 38, at 68-84. Ironically, current legislatures often fail to address fundamental
issues while enacting extremely complex statutory schemes. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
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not guarantee themselves re-election might well encourage them to adopt a
longer decisional time-horizon than the next election.9"
4. Incentives For Voters And Candidates
Although even a popular incumbent could not guarantee himself life-
time tenure in the legislature, lottery voting would not destroy political
accountability. Unlike a pure lottery, lottery voting does not ignore the
ballot box; the more popular a candidate, the greater his chances of vic-
tory. Indeed, lottery voting would emphasize the marginal voter in a way
that the current system cannot. Under lottery voting, an incumbent would
always have a strong incentive to please more constituents. Ex ante, there
would be a tremendous difference under lottery voting between a 51%/
49% margin over an opponent and a 90%/10% lead.91
Nor would lottery voting discourage people from voting. Although it is
quite unlikely that any given individual's ballot will be the one picked out
of the twirling basket-the one that "counts"-a rational individual does
not expend time, energy, and money to vote because he seriously believes
that his vote will determine the outcome of the election. Almost no election
for a representative is ever decided by one vote, so virtually no individual's
vote has ever "counted" in that strong sense.92 Individuals vote predomi-
nantly because of a sense of individual civic obligation, acquired by social-
ization, to participate in the community's decisionmaking process.9 3 If an-
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Congress refused to
strike basic tradeoff between safety and profits).
90. Instead of fixating on the upcoming election, party leaders would seek to maximize the long-
term popularity of the party (and thus the proportion of time they can expect to spend in office). Any
temptation to plunder the spoils of incumbency created by the uncertainty of re-election could be
restrained through mechanisms of party discipline and ideology, as is currently the case for retiring
Senators or second-term Presidents.
91. Of course, marginality exists currently to the extent that an incumbent often prefers a land-
slide re-election to a squeaker, especially if he aspires to a still-higher office. But the 51st vote out of
100 is still all-important, and a current incumbent has little or no incentive to reach out to a minority
group if by doing so he might threaten his solid electoral base. Suppose, for example, that an incum-
bent with a 60% approval rating confronts a situation in which he stands a 90% chance of wooing an
additional 30% of the electorate, and a 10% chance of failing to please the new constituents and
alienating half of his old ones. Even though the expected value of the votes to be gained
(90% x 30% = 27%) dwarfs the expected value of votes lost (10% x 30% = 3%), he would likely
avoid the potentially base-broadening move. He will then assuredly win under the current system,
with 60% of the votes, while if he gambles on pleasing new constituents he runs a 10% risk of defeat.
92. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 168-69 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); A.
DowNs, supra note 70, at 244 (probability of a given individual's vote being decisive virtually
infinitesimal).
93. See A. DOWNS, supra note 70, at 267-71; R. DowsE & J. HUGHES, POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
301-02 (1972); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42 (1970). This is not to
say, however, that civic obligation is the self-conscious reason most voters would give to explain why
they vote.
A final point deserving mention is that visible rewards of political participation powerfully bolster
the socialization process that encourages individuals to exert time and money to vote. Mainstream
citizens regularly see their preferred candidates elected. Each mainstream citizen feels fully repre-
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ything, lottery voting increases and celebrates that sense of individual
responsibility by guaranteeing that one individual's registered preference
will "count" in the strong sense.
B. Lottery Voting Compared to Cumulative Voting
Although lottery voting and cumulative voting both promote propor-
tional representation, they do so in different ways. A careful investigation
of these differences further illuminates the implications of lottery voting.
1. Proportional Representation and Cross-Sectionalism
Lottery voting has a number of advantages over cumulative voting. In
the absence of a strong party system where, for instance, voters vote for
parties themselves and not individual candidates, cumulative voting cannot
guarantee minorities proportional representation in the legislature. 4 Lot-
tery voting can ensure proportional representation without a strong party
system. Moreover, if a state is divided into many small multi-member dis-
tricts, the composition of the state assembly selected by cumulative voting
might fall far short of proportional representation.95 Indeed, unless the
state is treated as one large multi-member district, there is always an in-
centive to gerrymander because there are always alternative district maps
that change the number of seats a party could expect to receive. This is so
because, like the current system, cumulative voting fails to focus sharply
on the marginal voter and his individual moral responsibility. 6
2. Issue-Oriented Politics and Local Representation
Lottery voting would encourage minor parties to emphasize issues,
whereas cumulative voting may lead to the growth of fringe parties ener-
gized only by the charisma of established party chieftains. Under cumula-
sented and believes that his individual participation has been rewarded in some sense, even though his
individual vote in no way determined the outcome. The success of one's preferred candidate leads to
the feeling that one's vote has in some vague sense "counted," and encourages the individual to vote in
the future. Because thefirst-choice candidates of minority voters rarely win, the participation of indi-
vidual minority voters is never similarly rewarded, and minority voters may give up on the electoral
process. Lottery voting, however, ensures that some first-choice minority candidates will win, and
would thus tend to increase minority participation in voting. See Latimer, Black Political Representa-
tion in Southern Cities, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 65, 80-81 (1979) (black voter participation increases when
blacks no longer submerged in at-large elections).
94. In the example supra note 52, if the party miscalculates its strength and runs two candidates
who split the vote, or if party supporters fail to follow party instructions slavishly, the party may well
be denied proportional representation.
95. See Silva, supra note 38, at 755. Statewide or large-district elections, on the other hand, may
well be more expensive for minority parties (because of travel and media costs) than small-district
elections. Cf. supra pp. 1296-97 (discussing electoral economies of scale).
96. See supra pp. 1299-1300.
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tive voting, a minor party can simply run one or two candidates who are
guaranteed election if party loyalists "bullet" their votes.97 (Thus, cumu-
lative voting, like the current system, promotes the development of an en-
trenched cadre of professional legislators, and discourages rotation.) In a
lottery vote system, by contrast, a party will run a statewide slate of can-
didates:"B A minor party can be quite confident that some of its district
candidates will be elected, but it cannot know which ones. It would conse-
quently seek to emphasize the party platform more than the personal ap-
peal of a few party leaders.
Additionally, large multi-member districts-necessary to ensure cross-
sectionality under cumulative voting-undermine local representation.
Lottery voting, in cbntrast, is compatible with local (single member) dis-
tricts.99 Although a local representative under lottery voting would not
necessarily represent a local majority, he would nonetheless be a local citi-
zen.100 Furthermore, lottery voting may result in a beneficial change in
the perception of outgroups by the local majority. The idea that a black
citizen may occasionally be elected as a representative from a predomi-
nantly white district would serve as a useful reminder to local whites that
they do not constitute the whole community; local blacks, too, are citizens,
and as such are entitled to win some of the time.
3. Theoretical Implications
Finally and perhaps most important, cumulative voting is not as intui-
tively or theoretically straightforward-and thus not as heuristically valu-
able to the polity-as lottery voting. If nothing else, lottery voting is a
powerful theoretical paradigm that affords an especially sturdy vantage
point from which citizens could view some of the critical implications of,
and defects in, the current system of electing legislatures. The very notion
of lottery voting acutely focuses attention on the crucial, if controversial,
ideas that all votes should count equally in a way that they don't today;
that a local majority of fifty-one percent is not entitled to win one hundred
percent of the time; and that currently elected representatives often re-
present not "the people" of their local districts, but rather only a
part-the larger part, yes, but not the only part-of the entire commu-
97. See supra note 52 (describing "bulleting").
98. This assumes that a given candidate may not run in more than one district simultaneously. Cf
infra note 103 (suspending assumption).
99. Both local and proportional representation are important values. The current system achieves
the former by sacrificing the latter, while cumulative voting returns the compliment. Lottery voting
preserves both local and proportional representation.
100. Indeed, on specifically local issues, even a minority party's assemblyman might often re-
present a local majority: All citizens of Selma-black and white-may favor increased state aid to the
city.
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nity. Lottery voting would thus powerfully affirm to the polity the equal-
ity of all voters, not merely of those in the majority. Cumulative voting, in
contrast, sends the same implicit message as the current system: After all
the votes are added up, the votes of the "losers" should be disregarded and
only votes for the "winners" should count. Because cumulative voting
lacks the intuitive simplicity of lottery voting, it is more easily manipula-
ble. 1 Indeed, seemingly minor changes in voting rules could drastically
reduce the degree of proportionality in the final result.1 °2
4. The Virtues of Cumulative Voting
None of this, however, implies that the lottery voting paradigm should
leave us indifferent between cumulative voting and the current system. On
the contrary, large-district cumulative voting is far closer to the cross-
sectional ideal that animates lottery voting than is the current system.103
Thus, one important conclusion of the lottery voting thought experiment
is that this version of cumulative voting is-in principle, and not simply as
a matter of policy-much to be preferred over the prevalent mode of elect-
ing legislatures.!0
Indeed, in several respects, cumulative voting may be preferable to lot-
tery voting. Under lottery voting, a small-party legislator would be less
likely to be reelected than his major-party colleagues.10 5 This more rapid
rotation of office-holding means that minor parties would probably be
represented by legislators with less legislative experience, a state of affairs
that could disadvantage such parties.10 ' Additionally, cumulative voting
101. The complexity of cumulative voting may also disadvantage the less educated and thus, the
less wealthy. See Note, supra note 38, at 155.
102. A change in the rules concerning "bulleting," for example, could transform cumulative vot-
ing into "limited voting" or at-large voting-perhaps the most discriminatory system of all. See supra
notes 52, 59; Note, supra note 38.
103. Indeed, many of the salient differences between lottery voting and cumulative voting would
shrink or evaporate if lottery voting were modified by: (1) allowing (or requiring) voters to cast ballots
for parties or candidate slates instead of individual candidates, see supra p. 1300; (2) allowing a
candidate to run in more than one district, see supra note 98; or (3) using lottery voting in multi-
member districts, see supra note 1; p. 1301.
104. Cf. J. RAwIs, supra note 17, whose thought experiment of an "original position" behind a
"veil of ignorance" is designed to demonstrate how measures to help the worst-off elements of society
are justified as a matter of principle.
105. For example, a legislator from a 5% minority party stands a much lower chance of re-
election than one from a 55% majority party. An additional potential disadvantage of lottery voting's
increased rotation is that individual legislators may be less well-known to one another, a state of
affairs that could possibly lead to a reduction of the deference and courtesy currently extended to
legislative minorities, see infra p. 1304. On the other hand, rotation would dampen the development
of a legislative clubbism that tends to sever the government from the people. See supra p. 1298.
106. Indeed, there may even be a temptation under lottery voting for a minority candidate, once
elected, to sacrifice the interests of party constituents to broaden his electoral base and increase his
prospects for re-election. This is less likely to happen under cumulative voting, where a minority
candidate generally need only please those who first voted for him to win re-election.
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enables statewide minority voters to elect directly "their" representative,
while lottery voting would achieve proportional representation through a
system of "virtual" representation in which voters must sometimes rely on
legislators from other districts to represent their interests.10 7 Finally, be-
cause cumulative voting has been applied before,' it is of course a more
time-tested and politically realistic alternative than lottery voting.
IV. THE PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF
LOTTERY VOTING
A. The Unwisdom of Applying Lottery Voting to the Executive Branch
Although lottery voting is a workable method for electing legislatures, it
should not be used to select all public officials. It is, for example, an im-
practical way to choose a governor. The law of averages is of no use here;
unlike a legislature, one person cannot be cross-sectional. Moreover, the
turn-taking that lottery voting effects over time is dangerous when a given
individual can significantly damage the polity through his office. If two
percent of the people vote for eccentrics, one eccentric among fifty assem-
bly members cannot work serious harm. An eccentric governor, however,
could paralyze the state.
B. The Inapplicabilty of Lottery Voting to Issue-Votes
Lottery voting is an undesirable system for votes on individual bills. On
an issue-vote, the losers of a lottery vote could simply resubmit their pro-
posal the next day with the obvious danger of inconsistent results. To try
to prevent reconsideration of the proposal would be folly: Sometimes ex-
ternal circumstances change suddenly, and the polity needs to reconsider
suggestions previously rejected. Moreover, a ban on reconsideration would
be difficult to police: How much must an old proposal be amended in
order to qualify as "new"? These problems do not arise in the selection of
representatives because their election occurs only at well-defined periodic
intervals (e.g., once every two years).' 9 Thus, although a lottery vote can
be used to elect a legislature, the legislature itself should use majority
voting on bills." 0
107. See generally J. ELY, supra note 4, at 82-88 (using concept of virtual representation to
illustrate when courts should intervene).
108. For example, Illinois' lower house was selected by cumulative voting within three-member
districts until 1980. In that year, however, cumulative voting was abandoned in Illinois. See ILL.
CoNsr. art. IV, § 2. Variants of cumulative voting have also been employed in most Western Euro-
pean nations. See D. RAE, supra note 78, at 31-46 (citing examples).
109. This argument assumes, of course, that recall is not permitted.
110. The social choice rule used to choose representatives need not be the same rule used by
representatives. Jurors, for instance, can be selected by lot even though the jury verdict is usually
determined by unanimous vote.
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Although lottery voting would not skew the legislature against discrete
minorities (as does the current system), these minorities might of course
still be outvoted by a majority in the legislature itself. Nevertheless, lottery
voting is far more just to minorities than the pure democracy of the direct
initiative. Because of the structure of legislatures, minorities command
more respect from majorities in a legislature than in the polity at large.",
Perhaps we cannot force white voters to listen to blacks in their neighbor-
hoods, but black legislators can interact with and influence their white
colleagues. If full integration of schools, churches and neighborhoods is too
intrusive, at least we can avail ourselves of the advantages of specialization
of labor by integrating legislatures in the hopes of procuring more just
and balanced legislation."
Thus, Government by Initiative is cross-sectional, but not truly deliber-
ative. Government by Legislature (as legislatures are currently composed)
is deliberative but not truly cross-sectional. Government by a Footnote-
Four Judiciary is neither fully cross-sectional (since minorities need not
be proportionately represented on the bench) nor fully deliberative (since
there are severe constraints on the ability of the judge to receive relevant
policy information).'" A legislature selected by a lottery vote can be both
cross-sectional and deliberative." 4
C. The Danger of Pure Lottery
There is a risk that lottery voting could degenerate into a pure (Athe-
nian) lottery with each voter voting for himself in the hopes of "winning"
the perquisites of high office ("the Prize"). It might therefore be necessary
to put into the twirling basket only ballots cast for candidates receiving
more than, say, one percent of the total vote. " "
111. The transaction costs of coalition-building and log-rolling for many minority groups are
much lower in the legislature than in the polity at large. See Black, National Lawmaking By Initia-
tive? Let's Think Twice, 8 HuM. RTS., Fall 1979, at 28; Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the
Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403 (1982).
112. See supra p. 1286. Lottery voting thus helps soften the stunning irony that legislators may
not act with invidious purpose to discriminate against minorities, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), while voters motivated by discriminatory intent regularly succeed in electing virtually all-
white legislatures.
113. See supra p. 1285.
114. The etymology of the word "parliament"-a synonym for legislature-illustrates the central-
ity of legislative dialogue and deliberation: Derived from the French "parler," to talk, a parliament is
a talking body. The legislature is thus legitimated not so much by its expertise, see supra note 89, as
by its democratic character and by the dialogue and deliberation that it occasions. Cf Fiss, supra note
12, at 13, 38 (arguing that dialogue, independence, and competence legitimate the judiciary). The
democracy, dialogue, and deliberation of the legislature find strong parallels in jury theory.
115. The goal here, however, is not to disenfranchise or stifle minority-party voters or eccentrics,
but to eliminate from consideration those "candidates" who are "running" for office for reasons that
are venal and therefore not articulable to fellow citizens. Currently, candidates must often demonstrate
bona fide candidacy in order to qualify for ballot placement or matching funds. These rules typically
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D. The Constitutionality of Lottery Voting
Although critics might raise several obvious constitutional objections to
lottery voting, these objections lack merit. Lottery voting not only satisfies
but celebrates constitutional norms of republican government and equal
protection.
1. Republican Government
If lottery voting were used to elect state legislatures, the system might
be challenged as violative of Article IV's guarantee that every state have
"a republican form. of government." ' Such a challenge clearly should
fail. Lottery voting produces a legislature that combines the cross-
sectionalism of the direct initiative with the deliberative character of cur-
rent legislatures, and is superior to both;' if both the current legislative
electoral system and the direct initiative system satisfy the guarantee
clause, so should lottery voting a fortiori. Indeed, lottery voting would
create a legislature that would be far truer than current legislatures to the
framers' twin goals that a legislature both reflect and refine the views of
the polity." 8 Although lottery voting has never been used before, we must
be careful not to confuse the familiar with the constitutionally
necessary." 9
Similar arguments support the constitutionality of lottery voting to elect
U.S. Representatives or Senators. The relevant constitutional provisions
impose no express requirement of majority rule 20 and at least one court
has refused to infer such a requirement. 2 ' That refusal seems especially
require a candidate to gamer a minimum number of votes or receive the nomination of a recognized
political party. See, e.g., Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1976);
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1976).
116. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government").
117. See supra p. 1304.
118. See supra notes 35, 82. The implications of lottery voting are in many respects strikingly
harmonious with the republican ideology of the revolutionary period. See supra notes 62, 73, 82, 83,
87, 88.
119. The history of the direct initiative is instructive on this point. Now viewed by many as a
hallmark of modem democracy, the direct initiative was once attacked as repugnant to "republican
government." Compare Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (initiative and
referendum challenged as violative of republican government) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259
(1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (absence of initiative and referendum rendered malapportionment
unconstitutional).
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing
Senators."); id. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ).
121. Phillips v. Rockefeller, 435 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding New York's plurality vote
rule for U.S. Senate).
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sound since other sections of the Constitution do require majority votes;122
when the framers wanted to impose such a requirement, they did so
explicitly.
2. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws
applies by its terms to states1 23 and has been held to apply to the federal
government as a component of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause.'2 4 An argument could be made that, by introducing 25 chance into
the electoral process, lottery voting is arbitrary, anti-rational, and there-
fore violative of equal protection principles. 2 6 But lottery systems are not
always abdications to irrationality, and can instead be powerful weapons
to reaffirm our commitment to human equality.1 2 7 Few, for example,
would argue that majority rule is anti-rational or arbitrary merely be-
cause a bare majority can make the "wrong" choice. Lottery voting merely
extends the apparent equality of voters under majority rule-which does
not fully count minority voters-to all electors. In so doing, it champions
the true spirit of the equal protection clause: the protection of "minorities
from the tyranny of majority rule."'
2 8
The equal protection argument against lottery voting also focuses on the
wrong level of the electoral process. Although the election vel non of any
individual candidate depends on chance under lottery voting, the law of
averages ensures that the overall complexion of the legislature will be
122. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 (electoral college); id. amend. XII (same).
123. Id. amend. XIV § 1 ("[N]or shall any State . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
124. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
125. Fortune has always played an important role in politics. Indeed, one of the founders of
modern political science describes virtu ("virtue") andforluna ("chance") as the two dominant forces
in political affairs. N. MACHIEVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. 1 (Musa ed. 1964). Even today, the outcome
of an election may easily turn on such stochastic elements as the weather on election day or the exact
hour of the vote. Nevertheless, lottery voting enshrines the presence of randomness in ways that the
current system does not.
126. Case law, however, supports the constitutionality of electoral systems employing chance in
pursuit of equality and cross-sectionalism. See Cambell v. Board of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y.
1970), which upheld the use of random selection of surplus ballots in an election based on the "Hare"
system discussed supra note 38: "The fact that an element of chance is incorporated into a method of
election is not necessarily violative of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .There can be no denial of
equal protection when all share an equal opportunity to have their votes count in an election." Id. at
103-04 (emphasis added). See supra note 70 (lottery voting ensures equality of voting opportunity).
See also Moore v. Election Comm'rs, 309 Mass. 303, 333-34, 35 N.E.2d 222, 240 (1941) ("[A]
method of counting [votes] is not necessarily vitiated by the possibility of an element of chance in its
application to some situations that may arise if, in general, equality among all qualified voters is
maintained.").
127. See Greely, supra note 17, at 141; see also J. ELY, supra note 4, at 137 (suggesting constitu-
tionality of lottery-based allocative choices). Plato, justly celebrated for his commitment to reason, also
championed the lottery. See supra note 87.
128. Greely, supra note 17, at 138-39.
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anything but random or arbitrary. Because the power to legislate vests in
the legislative body as a whole, we should view the elections of individual
legislators as subsidiary to our overall, and eminently rational, plan to
create a cross-sectional legislative body. Current district systems are there-
fore precisely backwards. By focusing on the election of individual legisla-
tors in individual districts, these systems ignore cumulative effects on the
legislative body as a whole; inexplicably, the overall complexion of the
legislature is ultimately molded by an inherently arbitrary district map.129
Finally, the use of the lot to select jury venires dramatically undercuts
any equal protection argument against lottery voting. Given that the lot-
tery is now a preferred device in administering our system of formal jus-
tice, 30 its use as one part of our electoral system would seem to be consti-
tutional a fortiori.13 '
129. See supra pp. 1293-96.
130. See supra p. 1287-89.
131. To the extent that the jury is functionally and institutionally different from the legisla-
ture-that is, to the extent that juries are not "little parliaments," see supra note 18, it would seem
that cross-sectionalism is more important for legislatures. First, restrictions on cross-sectionalism are
more excusable in light of the rule of unanimity (or near unanimity) for criminal juries. A tiny cluster
of "extreme" jurors has absolute veto power over convictions and can force the state to undergo con-
siderable expense in retrying (or releasing) the defendant. Since legislatures are run by majority rule,
proportionate representation of all significant minority groups in the legislature does not raise the
spectre of impasse created by a majority held hostage. Second, the reduction of diversity of viewpoints
on the jury through peremptory challenge may serve to reduce improper, but unprovable, bias. Per-
sonal predispositions are anathema to the ideal of impartiality in judicial proceedings, but are often
the very stuff of politics. Third, because the jury is much smaller than the ordinary legislature, see
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding Florida six-man jury system), the law of averages
cannot guarantee the proportional representation of interests to the same degree that it does in the
legislature. See supra note 41.
Additionally, a jury gives no reasons for its verdict and typically sits for only one case. Random
selection therefore increases the prospect of inconsistent adjudications, a prospect in tension with the
rule of law, equal protection, and formal justice. These objections do not apply to a legislature selected
by lottery voting. Legislatures sit for extended stints and write laws of general applicability to be
applied alike in all like cases. The law of averages, when combined with the use of majority rule in
the legislature, will assure that the legislative "verdict" on a given issue-determined by the median
legislator-will not shift dramatically when a new legislature is chosen. Moreover, because lottery
voting uses the ballot box as well as the draw, legislators will be more accountable than randomly-
selected jurors. Lottery voting contemplates an assembly in which legislators are typically leaders of
the diverse groups in the polity. Lottery voting thus offers the cross-sectionalism of the random jury
without sacrificing the deliberateness, stature, and wisdom of the ideal "blue-ribbon" jury. See supra
p. 1297.
Finally, the jury as an institution simply cannot securely protect us against bad laws in the way
that a more cross-sectional legislature can. Juries sit only in a fraction of all civil and criminal cases,
and have no role whatsoever in administrative proceedings. And even in the few cases jurors hear,
they are expressly told that they may only find the facts: They are not supposed to make policy but
must follow the law as it is laid down by the judge. But see Jury Hearings, supra note 18, at 256
(remarks of Irving Kaufman) (jury is law-shaper).
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CONCLUSION
Enormous logistical, political, and psychological questions surrounding
lottery voting remain to be explored."3 2 One Note cannot hope to address
all these issues; this Note is meant only as a first word on a subject that
deserves the attention of legal theorists and political philosophers. After
deep consideration, many may reject lottery voting as a defective or un-
workable system in practice. But like the microeconomist's model of an
economy without transaction costs, or the philosopher's model of the per-
fectly just republic, the lottery voting model can also serve as a potent
heuristic device. By challenging our most deeply held and often unreflec-
tive assumptions about representative democracy and republicanism, the
lottery voting thought experiment can deepen our understanding of politi-
cal and constitutional questions of the first order, and can suggest new
approaches to age-old problems of minority rights in a majoritarian
society.
-Akhil Reed Amar
132. For example: How could we detect and prevent mechanical manipulation of the lottery?
Equally important, how could we prevent the appearance of manipulation? How might the appear-
ance of arbitrariness in individual elections affect citizens' and candidates' perceptions of government?
Would such a visible use of the lottery fit the nomos of modern America, where few share the ancient
Greek's view of fate-a view which may have more easily reconciled the ancients to myriad and
visible uses of lotteries?
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